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Abstract
Finance is about how the continuous stream of news gets incorporated into prices. But not all news
have the same impact. Can one distinguish the effects of the Sept. 11, 2001 attack or of the coup
against Gorbachev on Aug., 19, 1991 from financial crashes such as Oct. 1987 as well as smaller
volatility bursts? Using a parsimonious autoregressive process with long-range memory defined on the
logarithm of the volatility, we predict strikingly different response functions of the price volatility to great
external shocks compared to what we term endogeneous shocks, i.e., which result from the cooperative
accumulation of many small shocks. These predictions are remarkably well-confirmed empirically on
a hierarchy of volatility shocks. Our theory allows us to classify two classes of events (endogeneous
and exogeneous) with specific signatures and characteristic precursors for the endogeneous class. It also
explains the origin of endogeneous shocks as the coherent accumulations of tiny bad news, and thus
unify all previous explanations of large crashes including Oct. 1987.
1 Introduction
A market crash occurring simultaneously on most of the stock markets of the world as witnessed in Oct.
1987 would amount to the quasi-instantaneous evaporation of trillions of dollars. Market crashes are the
extreme end members of a hierarchy of market shocks, which shake stock markets repeatedly. Among
∗We acknowledge helpful discussions and exchanges with E. Bacry and V. Pisarenko. This work was partially supported by the
James S. Mc Donnell Foundation 21st century scientist award/studying complex system.
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recent events still fresh in memories are the Hong-Kong crash and the turmoil on US markets on oct. 1997,
the Russian default in Aug. 1998 and the ensuing market turbulence in western stock markets and the
collapse of the “new economy” bubble with the crash of the Nasdaq index in March 2000.
In each case, a lot of work has been carried out to unravel the origin(s) of the crash, so as to understand
its causes and develop possible remedies. However, no clear cause can usually be singled out. A case in
point is the Oct. 1987 crash, for which many explanations have been proposed but none has been widely
accepted unambiguously. These proposed causes include computer trading, derivative securities, illiquidity,
trade and budget deficits, over-inflated prices generated by speculative bubble during the earlier period, the
auction system itself, the presence or absence of limits on price movements, regulated margin requirements,
off-market and off-hours trading, the presence or absence of floor brokers, the extent of trading in the
cash market versus the forward market, the identity of traders (i.e. institutions such as banks or specialized
trading firms), the significance of transaction taxes, etc. More rigorous and systematic analyses on univariate
associations and multiple regressions of these various factors conclude that it is not at all clear what caused
the crash [Barro et al. (1989)]. The most precise statement, albeit somewhat self-referencial, is that the most
statistically significant explanatory variable in the October crash can be ascribed to the normal response of
each country’s stock market to a worldwide market motion [Barro et al. (1989)].
In view of the stalemate reached by the approaches attempting to find a proximal cause of a market shock,
several researchers have looked for more fundamental origins and have proposed that a crash may be the cli-
max of an endogeneous instability associated with the (rational or irrational) imitative behavior of agents (see
for instance [Orle´an (1989), Orle´an (1995), Johansen and Sornette (1999), Shiller (2000)]). Are there quali-
fying signatures of such a mechanism? According to [Johansen and Sornette (1999), Sornette and Johansen (2001)]
for which a crash is a stochastic event associated with the end of a bubble, the detection of such bubble would
provide a fingerprint. A large literature has emerged on the empirical detectability of bubbles in finan-
cial data and in particular on rational expectation bubbles (see [Camerer (1989), Adam and Szafarz (1992)]
for a survey). Unfortunately, the present evidence for speculative bubbles is fuzzy and unresolved at
best, according to the standard economic and econometric literature. Other than the still controversial
[Feigenbaum (2001)] suggestion that super-exponential price acceleration [Sornette and Andersen (2002)]
and log-periodicity may qualify a speculative bubble [Johansen and Sornette (1999), Sornette and Johansen (2001)],
there are no unambiguous signatures that would allow one to qualify a market shock or a crash as specifically
endogeneous.
On the other end, standard economic theory holds that the complex trajectory of stock market prices is the
faithful reflection of the continuous flow of news that are interpreted and digested by an army of analysts
and traders [Cutler et al. (1989)]. Accordingly, large shocks should result from really bad surprises. It is
a fact that exogeneous shocks exist, as epitomized by the recent events of Sept. 11, 2001 and the coup
against Gorbachev on Aug., 19, 1991, and there is no doubt about the existence of utterly exogeneous bad
news that move stock market prices and create strong bursts of volatility. However, some could argue that
precursory fingerprints of these events were known to some elites, suggesting the possibility the action
of these informed agents may have been reflected in part in stock markets prices. Even more difficult is
the classification (endogeneous versus exogeneous) of the hierarchy of volatility bursts that continuously
shake stock markets. While it is a common practice to associate the large market moves and strong bursts of
volatility with external economic, political or natural events [White (1996)], there is not convincing evidence
supporting it.
Here, we provide a clear and novel signature allowing us to distinguish between an endogeneous and an
exogeneous origin to a volatility shock. Tests on the Oct. 1987 crash, on a hierarchy of volatility shocks
and on a few of the obvious exogeneous shocks validate the concept. Our theoretical framework combines
a rather novel but really powerful and parsimonious so-called multifractal random walk with conditional
probability calculations.
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2 Long-range memory and distinction between endogeneous and exogeneous
shocks
While returns do not exhibit discernable correlations beyond a time scale of a few minutes in liquid arbi-
traged markets, the historical volatility (measured as the standard deviation of price returns or more generally
as a positive power of the absolute value of centered price returns) exhibits a long-range dependence charac-
terized by a power law decaying two-point correlation function [Ding et al. (1993), Ding and Granger (1996),
Arneodo et al. (1998)] approximately following a (t/T )−ν decay rate with an exponent ν ≈ 0.2. A vari-
ety of models have been proposed to account for these long-range correlations [Granger and Ding (1996),
Baillie (1996), Mu¨ller et al. (1997), Muzy et al. (2000), Muzy et al. (2001), Mu¨ller et al. (1997)].
In addition, not only are returns clustered in bursts of volatility exhibiting long-range dependence, but they
also exhibit the property of multifractal scale invariance (or multifractality), according to which moments
mq ≡ 〈|rτ |q〉 of the returns at time scale τ are found to scale as mq ∝ τ ζq , with the exponent ζq being a
non-linear function of the moment order q [Mandelbrot (1997), Muzy et al. (2000)].
To make quantitative predictions, we use a flexible and parsimonious model, the so-called multifractal ran-
dom walk (MRW) (see Appendix A and [Muzy et al. (2000), Bacry et al. (2001)]), which unifies these two
empirical observations by deriving naturally the multifractal scale invariance from the volatility long range
dependence.
The long-range nature of the volatility correlation function can be seen as the direct consequence of a
slow power law decay of the response function K∆(t) of the market volatility measured a time t after the
occurrence of an external perturbation of the volatility at scale ∆t. We find that the distinct difference
between exogeneous and endogeneous shocks is found in the way the volatility relaxes to its unconditional
average value.
The prediction of the MRW model (see Appendix B for the technical derivation) is that the excess volatility
Eexo[σ
2(t) | ω0]− σ2(t), at scale ∆t, due to an external shock of amplitude ω0 relaxes to zero according to
the universal response
Eexo[σ
2(t) | ω0]− σ2(t) ∝ e2K0t−1/2 − 1 ≈ 2K0√
t
, (1)
for not too small times, where σ2(t) = σ2∆t is the unconditional average volatility. This prediction is
nothing but the response function K∆t(t) of the MRW model to a single piece of very bad news that is
sufficient by itself to move the market significantly. This prediction is well-verified by the empirical data
shown in figure 1.
On the other hand, an “endogeneous” shock is the result of the cumulative effect of many small bad news,
each one looking relatively benign taken alone, but when taken all together collectively along the full path
of news can add up coherently due to the long-range memory of the volatility dynamics to create a large
“endogeneous” shock. This term “endogeneous” is thus not exactly adequate since prices and volatilities
are always moved by external news. The difference is that an endogeneous shock in the present sense is the
sum of the contribution of many “small” news adding up according to a specific most probable trajectory.
It is this set of small bad news prior to the large shock that not only led to it but also continues to influence
the dynamics of the volatility time series and creates an anomalously slow relaxation. Appendix C gives the
derivation of the specific relaxation (21) associated with endogeneous shocks.
Figure 2 reports empirical estimates of the conditional volatility relaxation after local maxima of the S&P100
intradaily series made of 5 minute close prices during the period from 04/08/1997 to 12/24/2001 (figure
1(a)). The original intraday squared returns have been preprocessed in order to remove the U-shaped volatil-
ity modulation associated with the intraday variations of market activity. Figure 2(b) shows that the MRW
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Figure 1: Cumulative excess volatility at scale ∆t = 1 day, that is, integral over time of Eexo[σ2(t) | ω0]−
σ2(t), due to the volatility shock induced by the coup against President Gorbachev observed in three British,
Japanese and USA indices and the shock induced by the attack of September 11, 2001 against the World
Trade Center. The dashed line is the theoretical prediction obtained by integrating (1), which gives a ∝ √t
time-dependence. The cumulative excess volatility following the crash of October 1987 is also shown with
circles. Notice that the slope of the non-constant curve for the October 1987 crash is very different from the
value 1/2 expected and observed for exogeneous shocks. This crash and the resulting volatility relaxation
can be interpreted as an endogeneous event.
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Figure 2: Measuring the conditional volatility response exponent α(s) for S&P 100 intradaily time series
as a function of the endogeneous shock amplitude parameterized by s, defined by (19). (a) The original
5 minute intradaily time series from 04/08/1997 to 12/24/2001. The 5 minute de-seasonalized squared
returns are aggregated in order to estimate the 40 minutes and daily volatilities. (b) 40 minute log-volatility
covariance C40(τ) as a function of the logarithm of the lag τ . The MRW theoretical curve with λ2 = 0.018
and T = 1 year (dashed line) provides an excellent fit of the data up to lags of one month. (c) Conditional
volatility response ln(Eendo[σ2(t) | s]) as a function of ln(t) for three shocks with amplitudes given by
s = −1, 0, 1. (d) Estimated exponent α(s) for ∆t = 40 minutes (•) as a function of s. The solid line
is the prediction corresponding to Eq. (22). The dashed line corresponds to the empirical MRW estimate
obtained by averaging over 500 Monte-Carlo trials. It fits more accurately for negative s (volatility lower
than normal) due to the fact that the estimations of the variance by aggregation over smaller scales is very
noisy for small variance values. The error bars give the 95 % confidence intervals estimated by Monte-Carlo
trials of the MRW process. In the inset, α(s) is compared for ∆t = 40 minutes (•) and ∆t = 1 day (×).
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model provides a very good fit of the empirical volatility covariance in a range of time scales from 5 minutes
to one month. Fig. 2(c) plots in a double logarithmic representation, for the time scale ∆t = 40 minutes,
the estimated conditional volatility responses for s = 1, 0,−1, where the endogeneous shocks are parame-
terized by e2s σ2(t). A value s > 0 (resp. s < 0) corresponds to a positive bump (resp. negative dip) of the
volatility above (resp. below) the average level σ2(t). The straight lines are the predictions (Eqs. (24,22))
of the MRW model and qualify power law responses whose exponents α(s) are continuous function of the
shock amplitude s. Figure 1(d) plots the conditional response exponent α(s) as a function of s for the two
time scales ∆t = 40 minutes and ∆t = 1 day (inset). For ∆t = 40 minutes, we observe that α varies
between −0.2 for the largest positive shocks to +0.2 for the largest negative shocks, in excellent agreement
with MRW estimates (dashed line) and, for α ≥ 0, with Eq. (22) obtained without any adjustable parame-
ters. 1 The error bars represent the 95 % confidence intervals estimated using 500 trials of synthetic MRW
with the same parameters as observed for the S&P 100 series. By comparing α(s) for different ∆t (inset),
we can see the the MRW model is thus able to recover not only the s-dependence of the exponent α(s) of
the conditional response function to endogeneous shocks but also its time scale ∆t variations: this exponent
increases as one goes from fine to coarse scales. Similar results are obtained for other intradaily time series
(Nasdaq, FX-rates, etc.). We also obtain the same results for 17 years of daily return times series of various
indices (French, German, canada, Japan, etc.).
In summary, the most remarkable result is the qualitatively different functional dependence of the response
(1) to an exogeneous compared to the response (24,22) to an endogeneous shock. The former gives a decay
of the burst of volatility ∝ 1/t1/2 compared to 1/tα(s) for endogeneous shocks with amplitude e2s σ2(t),
with an exponent α(s) being a linear function of s.
3 Discussion
What is the source of endogeneous shocks characterized by the response function (21)? Appendix D and
equation (29) predict that the expected path of the continuous information flow prior to the endogeneous
shock grows proportionally to the response function K(tc − t) measured in backward time to the shock
occuring at tc. In other words, conditioned on the observation of a large endogeneous shock, there is
specific set of trajectories of the news flow that led to it. This specific flow has an expectation given by (29).
This result allows us to understand the distinctive features of an endogeneous shock compared to an external
shock. The later is a single piece of very bad news that is sufficient by itself to move the market significantly
according to (1). In contrast, an “endogeneous” shock is the result of the cumulative effect of many small
bad news, each one looking relatively benign taken alone, but when taken all together collectively along
the full path of news can add up coherently due to the long-range memory of the log-volatility dynamics to
create a large “endogeneous” shock. This term “endogeneous” is thus not exactly adequate since prices and
volatilities are always moved by external news. The difference is that an endogeneous shock in the present
sense is the sum of the contribution of many “small” news adding up according to a specific most probable
trajectory. It is this set of small bad news prior to the large shock that not only led to it but also continues to
influence the dynamics of the volatility time series and creates the anomalously slow relaxation (21).
In this respect, this result allows us to rationalize and unify the many explanations proposed to account for
the Oct. 1987 crash: according to the present theory, each of the explanations is insufficient to explain
the crash; however, our theory suggests that it is the cumulative effect of many such effects that led to the
crash. In a sense, the different commentators and analysts were all right in attributing the origin of the
Oct. 1987 crash to many different factors but they missed the main point that the crash was the extreme
1The deviation of α(s) from expression (22) for negative s, originates from the error in the volatility estimation using a sum of
squared returns. The smaller the sum of squared returns, the larger the error is. As ∆t increases, this error becomes negligible
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response of the system to the accumulation of many tiny bad news contributions. To test this idea, we note
that the decay of the volatility response after the Oct. 1987 crash has been described by a power law 1/t0.3
[Lillo and Mantegna (2001)], which is in line with the prediction of our MRW theory with equation (22)
for such a large shock (see also figure 2 panel d). This value of the exponent is still significantly smaller
than 0.5. Figure 1 demonstrates further the difference between the relaxation of the volatility after this event
shown with circle and those following the exogenous coup against Gorbachev and the September 11 attack.
There is clearly a strong constrast which qualifies the Oct. 1987 crash as endogeneous, in the sense of our
theory of “conditional response.” This provides an independent confirmation of the concept advanced before
in [Johansen and Sornette (1999), Sornette and Johansen (2001)].
It is also interesting to compare the prediction (21) with those obtained with a linear autoregressive model
of the type (5), in which ω(t) is replaced by σ(t). FIGARCH models fall in this general class. It is easy
to show in this case that this linear (in volatility) model predicts the same exponent for the response of the
volatility to endogeneous shocks, independently of their magnitude. This prediction is in stark constrast
with the prediction (21) of the log-volatility MRW model. The later model is thus strongly validated by our
empirical tests.
Appendix A: The Multifractal Randow Walk (MRW) model
The multifractal random walk model is the continuous time limit of a stochastic volatility model where
log-volatility2 correlations decay logarithmically. It possesses a nice “stability” property related to its scale
invariance property: For each time scale ∆t ≤ T , the returns at scale ∆t, r∆t(t) ≡ ln[p(t)/p(t−∆t)], can
be described as a stochastic volatility model:
r∆t(t) = ǫ(t) · σ∆t(t) = ǫ(t) · eω∆t(t) , (2)
where ǫ(t) is a standardized Gaussian white noise independent of ω∆t(t) and ω∆t(t) is a nearly Gaussian
process with mean and covariance:
µ∆t =
1
2
ln(σ2∆t)− C∆t(0) (3)
C∆t(τ) = Cov[ω∆t(t), ω∆t(t+ τ)] = λ
2 ln
(
T
|τ |+ e−3/2∆t
)
. (4)
σ2∆t is the return variance at scale ∆t and T represents an “integral” (correlation) time scale. Such log-
arithmic decay of log-volatility covariance at different time scales has been demonstrated empirically in
[Arneodo et al. (1998), Muzy et al. (2000)]. Typical values for T and λ2 are respectively 1 year and 0.02.
According to the MRW model, the volatility correlation exponent ν is related to λ2 by ν = 4λ2.
The MRW model can be expressed in a more familiar form, in which the log-volatility ω∆t(t) obeys an
auto-regressive equation whose solution reads
ω∆t(t) = µ∆t +
∫ t
−∞
dτ η(τ) K∆t(t− τ) , (5)
where η(t) denotes a standardized Gaussian white noise and the memory kernel K∆t(·) is a causal function,
ensuring that the system is not anticipative. The process η(t) can be seen as the information flow. Thus ω(t)
represents the response of the market to incoming information up to the date t. At time t, the distribution
2The log-volatilty is the natural quantity used in canonical stochatic volatility models (see [Kim et al. (1998), and references
therein]).
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of ω∆t(t) is Gaussian with mean µ∆t and variance V∆t =
∫
∞
0 dτ K
2
∆t(τ) = λ
2 ln
(
Te3/2
∆t
)
. Its covariance,
which entirely specifies the random process, is given by
C∆t(τ) =
∫
∞
0
dt K∆t(t)K∆t(t+ |τ |) . (6)
Performing a Fourier tranform, we obtain Kˆ∆t(f)2 = Cˆ∆t(f) = 2λ2 f−1
[∫ Tf
0
sin(t)
t dt+O (f∆t ln(f∆t))
]
,
which shows that for τ small enough
K∆t(τ) ∼ K0
√
λ2T
τ
for ∆t << τ << T . (7)
This slow power law decay (7) of the memory kernel in (5) ensures the long-range dependence and multifrac-
tality of the stochastic volatility process (2). Note that equation (5) for the log-volatility ω∆t(t) takes a form
similar to but simpler than the ARFIMA models usually defined on the (linear) volatility σ [Baillie (1996)].
Appendix B: Linear response to an external shock
Let us assume that new major piece of information η(t) = ω0 δ(t) impinges on the market at some time
(taken without loss of generality to be t = 0, since the system is stationary). ω0 is the amplitude of the
external shock. Then, using the formalism of Appendix A, the response of the log-volatility ω(t), t > 0 to
this shock is
ω(t) = µ+
∫ t
−∞
dτ [ω0 · δ(τ) + η(τ)] K(t− τ) (8)
= µ+ ω0 K(t) +
∫ t
−∞
dτ η(τ) K(t− τ) . (9)
where, for notation convenience, we have omitted the reference to the scale ∆t. The expected volatility
conditional on this incoming major information is thus
Eexo[σ
2(t) | ω0] = Eexo
[
e2w(t) | ω0
]
= e2ω0 K(t) E
[
e2
∫ t
−∞
dτ η(τ) K(t−τ)
]
= σ2(t)e2ω0 K(t) (10)
≃ σ2(t)e2K0
√
λ2T
t for ∆t << t << T. (11)
For time t large enough, the volatility relaxes to its unconditional average value σ2(t) = σ2∆t, so that the
excess volatility Eexo[σ2(t) | ω0]− σ2(t) due to the external shock decays to zero as
Eexo[σ
2(t) | ω0]− σ2(t) ∝ 1√
t
. (12)
This universal response of the volatility to an external shock (i.e., independent of the amplitude ω0 of the
shock) is governed by the time-dependence (7) of the memory kernel K(t). Note also that the exponent 1/2
of this power law decay does not depend on the specific functional form choosen for the volatility. Indeed,
we could have choosen to define the volatily by the expectation of any power of the absolute returns, the
exponent 1/2 of the power law would have remain the same.
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Appendix C: “Conditional response” to an endogeneous shock
Let us consider the natural evolution of the system, without any large external shock, which nevertheless
exhibits a large volatility burst ω(t = 0) = ω0 at t = 0. From the definition (2) with (5) and (6), it is
clear that a large “endogeneous” shock requires a special set of realization of the “small news” {η(t)}. To
quantifies the response in such case, we can evaluate Eendo[σ2(t) | ω0] = Eendo[e2ω(t) | ω0]. Since ω(t) is a
Gaussian process, the new process ω(t) conditional on ω0 remains Gaussian, so that
Eendo[σ
2(t) | ω0] = Eendo[e2ω(t) | ω0] (13)
= exp (2E[w(t) | ω0] + 2Var[ω(t) | ω0]) . (14)
Due to the still Gaussian nature of the condition log-volatility ω(t), we easily obtain using (3) and (4),
Eendo[ω(t) | ω0] = E[ω(t)] + Cov[ω(t), ω0]
Var[ω0]
· (ω0 − E[ω0]) , (15)
= (ω0 − µ) · C(t)
C(0)
+ µ , (16)
and
Varendo[ω(t) | ω0] = Var[ω(t)]− Cov[ω(t), ω0]
2
Var[ω0]
, (17)
= C(0)
(
1− C
2(t)
C2(0)
)
. (18)
Let us set:
e2ω0 = e2sσ2(t)⇒ ω0 − µ = s+ C(0) (19)
By subsitution in (14), we obtain thanks to (3) and (4),
Eendo[σ
2(t) | ω0] = σ2(t) exp
[
2(ω0 − µ) · C(t)
C(0)
− 2C
2(t)
C(0)
]
, (20)
= σ2(t)
(
T
t
)α(s)+β(t)
(21)
where
α(s) =
2s
ln(Te
3/2
∆t )
, (22)
β(t) = 2λ2
ln(t/∆t)
ln(Te3/2/∆t)
. (23)
Within the range ∆t < t << ∆te
|s|
λ2 , β(t) << α(s) and Eq. (21) leads to a power-law behavior:
Eendo[σ
2(t) | ω0] ∼ t−α(s) (24)
Notice that |s|λ−2 provides directly the logarithmic scaling range over which the power-law can be observed.
Since λ−2 ∼ 20, this range can quickly extend over the whole time domain [ln(∆t), ln(T )].
Along the same line, we can also compute the conditional variance Var
[
σ2(t) | ω0
]
. After a little algebra,
we get:
Varendo
[
σ2(t) | ω0
]
= σ2(t)
2
(
T
t
)2α(s)+2β(t)(
(
Te3/2
∆t
)4λ
2
(
T
t
)−2β
′(t) − 1
)
(25)
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where
β′(t) = 2λ2
ln(T/t)
ln(Te3/2/∆t)
(26)
It is thus easy to obtain the estimate:
√
Varendo [σ2(t) | ω0] ≤ Eendo[σ2(t) | ω0]
(
(
T
∆t
)2β(t) − 1
)1/2
.
√
6λ2 ln(te3/2/∆t) Eendo[σ
2(t) | ω0]
(27)
We thus conclude, that, for s large enough (i.e., α(s) large enough):
Eendo[σ
2(t) | ω0]− σ2(t)√
Varendo [σ2(t) | ω0]
&
1√
6λ2 ln(te3/2/∆t)
(28)
Over the first decade ∆t ≤ t ≤ 10∆t, the deviation of the conditional mean volatility from the unconditional
volatility σ2(t) is greater than the conditional variance, which ensures the existence of a strong deterministic
component of the conditional response above the stochastic components.
Expressions (24,22) are our two main predictions. These equations predict that the conditional response
function Eendo[σ2(t) | ω0] of the volatility decays as a power law ∼ 1/tα of the time since the endogeneous
shock, with an exponent α ≈
(
2ω0 − ln(σ2(t))
)
λ2
C(0) which depends linearly upon the amplitude ω0 of the
shock. Note in particular, that α changes sign: it is positive for w0 > 12 ln(σ2(t)) and negative otherwise.
Appendix D: Determination of the sources of endogeneous shocks
What is the source of endogeneous shocks characterized by the response function (21)? To answer, let
us consider the process W (t) ≡ ∫ t
−∞
dτ η(τ), where η(t) is a standardized Gaussian white noise which
captures the information flow impacting on the volatility, as defined in (5). Extending the property (16), we
find that
Eendo[W (t) | ω0] = Cov[W (t), ω0]
Var[ω0]
· (ω0 − E[ω0]) ∝ (ω0 − E[ω0])
∫ t
−∞
dτ K(−τ) . (29)
Expression (29) predicts that the expected path of the continuous information flow prior to the endogeneous
shock (i.e., for t < 0) grows like ∆W (t) = η(t)∆t ∼ K(−t)∆t ∼ ∆t/√−t for t < 0 upon the approach
to the time t = 0 of the large endogeneous shock. In other words, conditioned on the observation of a large
endogeneous shock, there is specific set of trajectories of the news flow η(t) that led to it. These conditional
news flows have an expectation given by (29).
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